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Abstract 
Prospective memory is defined as the ability to formulate and carry out actions at the appropriate 
time, or in the appropriate context. The aim of this study was to identify the effect of hypnosis on 
prospective memory performance and to analyze the involvement of executive control processes 
in intention realization in a hypnotically altered state of consciousness. In one experiment, 
manipulating hypnotic instruction in a within-subject fashion, we explored event based 
prospective memory performance in three conditions – baseline, expectation and execution - of 
twenty-three volunteers. Our main result is that executing prospective memory responses, at the 
same accuracy rate, produced a significantly lower cost of ongoing responses in terms of 
response latency in the hypnotic state than in wake condition.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Enacting planned actions when encountering relevant environmental cues at an appropriate time 
in the future is a fundamental task for all human beings that enables them to live an independent 
and socially adaptive lifestyle. Prospective memory (PM) refers to the function of encoding, 
storage, and delayed retrieval of intended actions (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Ellis, 1996; Ellis 
& Freeman, 2008). Intact functioning of PM relies upon a distributed neural network involving 
the rostral and dorsolateral part of the frontal cortex, the parietal cortex, the hippocampal 
complex and also the thalamus (Burgess, Quayle, & Frith, 2001; Burgess et al., 2003; Okuda et 
al., 2001; West, 2008). The injury of this network can produce a serious dysfunction of PM, as it 
has been detected following extensive frontal lobe lesion and has been identified in a range of 
psychiatric conditions with deficit of executive frontal lobe functions (Burgess, 2000; Burgess, 
Veitch, De Lacy Costello, & Shallice, 2000; Elvevåg, Maylor, & Gilbert, 2003; Fortin, Godbout, 
& Braun, 2002; Fortin, Godbout, & Braum, 2003; Kliegel, Jager, Altgassen, & Shum, 2008; 
Kondel, 2002; Kumar, Nizamie, & Jahan, 2005; Racsmány, Demeter, Csigó, Harsányi, & 
Németh, 2011; Schum, Ungvari, Tang, & Leung, 2004). Prospective remembering involves a 
number of information processing components, such as formation, retention, execution, and 
evaluation or monitoring of planned actions (see Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002). 
Recent theoretical models of PM consider the role of executive frontal system in carrying out 
appropriate prospective responses in several different ways. According to the supervisory 
attentional system (SAS) model, the executive control system, known to rely on frontal 
networks, monitors the environment for target events that indicate when it is appropriate to 
execute the intended prospective response (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Norman & Shallice, 
1986). The multiprocess model proposes that PM is supported by automatic processes when 
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there is a strong association between the PM target event and the intended actions. However, in 
certain circumstances, for instance when PM target events are not salient, or there is no strong 
association between the target event and the intended action, the PM response is mediated by 
more strategic processes (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 
2004). A third influential theory, the preparatory attentional and memory processes model 
(PAM) proposes that non-automatic attentional processes are always involved in PM retrieval 
(Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). One component of these preparatory attentional processes 
is monitoring for PM target events that indicate the appropriate time for PM actions. In sum, the 
involvement of the frontal executive system in PM is both a fundamental theoretical and a 
practical question. 
As fast and reversible changes of attentional and memory processing are experienced in 
hypnosis, it was recently suggested that this altered state of consciousness is a useful tool for 
cognitive neuroscience research (Raz & Shapiro, 2002). It has been widely demonstrated that 
hypnosis impairs the performance on executive tasks. Participants produced impaired 
performance on fluency and Stroop tasks in hypnosis, while hypnotic induction left implicit 
sequence learning, known to rely on fronto-striatal networks, intact or even enhanced (Farvolden 
& Woody, 2004; Kaiser, Barker, Haenschel, Baldeweg, & Gruzelier, 1997; Kallio, Revonsuo, 
Hamalainen, Markela, & Gruzelier, 2001; Nemeth, Janacsek, Polner, & Kovacs, 2013; Wagstaff, 
Cole, Brunas-Wagstaff, 2007). These results are in line with the dissociated-control hypothesis 
that assumes that hypnosis weakens the executive control of behavior (Woody & Bowers, 1994). 
This theory has received support from studies demonstrating that hypnosis reduces the 
connectivity between frontal lobe and other brain areas, most importantly disconnecting frontal 
lobe from the anterior cingular cortex, a brain structure usually associated with conflict 
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monitoring (Egner, Jamieson, & Gruzelier, 2005;  Fingelkurts, Kallio, & Revonsuo, 2007; 
Gruzelier, 2006). Therefore, hypnosis may serve as an appropriate tool to investigate the role of 
executive frontal system in performing a PM task. 
In the present experiment, we aimed to use hypnosis as a tool to attenuate the involvement of the 
executive system in performing a PM task. We applied a PM task designed by Burgess et al. 
(2001) for a positron emission tomography (PET) study. In this procedure, participants were 
instructed to perform a task under three conditions: a baseline condition where only ongoing 
activities were performed, a prospective expectation condition where prospective cues were 
expected but were never presented, and an execution condition where prospective cues were 
actually presented. Burgess and colleagues found larger activations in the frontal pole (middle 
frontal gyrus), right parietal lobe, and precuneus region in both the expectation and the execution 
conditions relative to the baseline condition (Burgess et al., 2001). This result was interpreted as 
evidence that the activated network supports the maintenance of intentions during the course of 
ongoing activity. The comparison of the expectation and execution conditions revealed 
significant differences: the activation of the right thalamus, accompanied by decreases in the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (RDLPFC), seemed to be associated with the realization and 
execution of delayed intentions. 
This task was selected because the neural networks that are involved in accomplishing this 
specific task are known (Burgess et al., 2001). The design of the task allowed us to separately 
investigate the involvement of the executive system in maintaining and executing a PM response 
(Racsmány et al., 2011). Based on the results of Burgess et al. (2001) we hypothesized that 
executive monitoring of prospective cues and shifting between ongoing and prospective 
responses puts an extra load on ongoing task processing when participants are awake and this 
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will be present in an increase of reaction times of the ongoing task. In accordance with the 
multiprocess model of PM (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), we also assumed that hypnosis will 
decrease the involvement of executive system and participants will accomplish the task in a more 
automatic and faster way when they are in hypnosis. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty-three volunteers (mean age = 24.3 years, SD = 1.33; education = 17.04 years, SD = .56) 
without any psychiatric or neurological disorder took part in the study. They were not paid for 
participating. 
Hypnotizability was measured using the Hungarian version of the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962). Statistical scoring procedures from the original 
English language version were employed. The mean hypnotizability scores were: cognitive 
scores = .95 (SD = .71), motor scores = 5.83 (SD = 2.66), total scores = 6.78 (SD = 3.03). 
Because hypnotizability, a stable personal trait, is distributed dimensionally in the population, 
the categorization of low-high can be artificial and, thus, likely to be distorting. In our study, the 
distribution of hypnotizability was almost perfectly normal, so the low-high categorization of our 
sample seemed inappropriate. 
Written informed consent was obtained prior to the study. The project was approved by the 
institutional ethical review board. 
 
2.2. Experimental design and procedure 
Susceptibility to hypnosis was measured in groups of 5-9 persons. The hypnosis was led by a 
qualified, experienced hypnotist, following the standard induction of the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962). On the following day, participants performed the 
event based PM task in alert waking and in hypnotic states of consciousness with the same 
standard instructions in counterbalanced order. We followed a within subject design and the two 
experimental conditions were randomized for each subject. 
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Since we were concerned that the style of the hypnotic induction, its formal elements, and its 
content could affect the depth of hypnosis achieved, we endeavored to ensure standardization. A 
skilled therapist with extensive experience with hypnosis tape-recorded the induction, 
instructions, and dehypnotizing phases. This recording was played to every participant. The type 
of hypnosis induction was essentially a relaxing one. 
Regarding the PM task, we closely adhered to the protocol established by Burgess et al. (2001). 
An event-based PM task was administered to each participant under three conditions: (1) a 
baseline condition in which there was no expectation that PM stimuli would occur, and no PM 
stimuli occurred; (2) an expectation condition in which participants were told that PM stimuli 
might occur, though none actually did; and (3) an execution condition in which participants were 
told that PM stimuli might occur, and stimuli did occur. This procedure allowed us to separate 
and compare the performances associated with intention maintenance and its realization. 
Sixty stimuli were presented in the baseline and expectation conditions and eighty in the 
execution condition. The execution condition contained PM stimuli that were pseudorandomly 
distributed, amounting to 25% of the stimuli. In each condition, the first six stimuli were practice 
items and were not included in the analysis. 
The order of the conditions (baseline, expectation, and execution) followed this protocol: the 
baseline for each task was always given first, but the order of the expectation and execution 
conditions was randomized, to prevent subjects from being able to work out an established 
strategy. 
Stimuli presentation strictly adhered to the Burgess et al. (2001) procedure and was subject-
paced (i.e., the onset of the next stimulus was cued by the subject’s response, and the stimuli 
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remained visible until that response occurred). A 2000 msec blank white screen interval was 
inserted between presentations. 
In each trial, two arrows were presented on the display. One arrow was always black, and its 
position varied pseudorandomly. In both the baseline and expectation conditions, stimuli 
included 30 items in which the black arrow pointed to the left and an additional 30 items in 
which it pointed to the right. The same ratio in the execution condition was 40/40. Two color 
bars also appeared on the screen and were located at equal distances above and below the arrows. 
The color of the horizontal bars were red, blue, green, yellow, or orange (see Figure 1). 
 
- Figure 1 about here – 
 
Participants were positioned with the forefinger, middle finger, and third finger of their right 
hand on the three arrow keys of the computer keyboard. Written instructions were read to the 
participants immediately before each experimental block was administered. Participants were 
asked to press the key with their forefinger if the arrow was to the left of a fixation point and 
with their third finger if it was to the right. In the expectation and execution conditions 
participants were told to respond with their middle finger if the two color bars above and below 
the fixation point were the same color on any trial, this instruction served as a PM task. 
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3. Results 
Mean RTs for the ongoing task were analyzed in a Group (Alert waking state and Hypnotic state) 
X Condition (baseline, expectation, execution) repeated measures ANOVA. Analysis of RTs was 
based on errorless trials. The Group (Alert waking state and Hypnotic state) X Condition 
(baseline, expectation, execution) repeated measures ANOVA for the participants’ mean RTs in 
the ongoing task showed a significant main effect of condition [F(2,44) = 228.14, p < .001, 
η
2
partial = .91] and no significant effect of group [F < 1]. There was a significant group X 
condition interaction, [F(2,44) = 5.71, p < .01, η2partial = .21]. We found a significant difference 
between the two groups [t(22) = 2.11, p < .05, r = .25] only in the ongoing task of the execution 
condition. There was no significant difference in the baseline condition [t(22) = .84, p > .05, r = 
.09], and in the expectation condition [t(22) = -.25, p > .05 r = -.03] (see Figure 2). Comparison 
of the waking and the hypnotic group RTs in the PM task of the execution condition [t(22) = .25, 
p > .05, r = .03] revealed no significant differences (see Figure 3). In sum, subjects performed 
significantly faster in the ongoing task of the execution condition in hypnotic state compared to 
the alert waking state. 
 
- Figures 2 and 3 about here – 
 
To further analyze our data, a “cost of PM instruction” was calculated for both the expectation 
condition (mean ongoing task RT in the expectation condition – mean ongoing task RT in the 
baseline condition) and the execution condition (mean ongoing task RT in the execution 
condition – mean ongoing task RT in the baseline condition). Comparison of alert waking and 
hypnotic group expectation costs revealed no significant difference [t(22) = -1.22, p > .05, r = -
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.18], while the same comparison yielded a significant difference for execution costs [t(22) = 2.4, 
p < .05, r = .26] (see Table 1). 
 
- Table 1 about here –  
 
Similarly to the Burgess et al. (2001) study, errors for non-PM and PM stimuli were rare. Hit rate 
was above 90 % in the PM task, and above 99 % in the ongoing tasks in all the three 
experimental conditions in both states of consciousness. 
 
4. Discussion 
This study examined the effect of hypnosis on PM. Particularly, it tested the hypothesis that 
hypnosis attenuates the time cost of executing prospective responses embedded in a stream of 
ongoing responses. Our findings confirmed this hypothesis. Earlier, it was demonstrated that 
hypnosis decreased the involvement of executive control in complex cognitive tasks (Farvolden 
& Woody, 2004; Kaiser et al., 1997; Kallio et al., 2001; Wagstaff et al., 2007). Based on this, we 
suggest that the beneficial effect of hypnosis on RTs of the ongoing task was the consequence of 
attenuated executive control of the PM task. 
Importantly, hypnotic and alert conditions did not differ significantly in the baseline condition, 
suggesting that hypnotic induction did not alter the average reaction time in the ongoing task. 
The cost of executing a prospective cue while carrying out an ongoing task differed significantly 
in the hypnotic and alert conditions. This result suggests that hypnosis attenuates the executive 
control of monitoring of prospective cues during the ongoing task. Participants responded 
significantly faster for the ongoing cues while they were in a hypnotic state and we argue that 
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this result is not due to a speed/accuracy trade off as accuracy rates did not differ in the hypnotic 
and the alert conditions. This latter finding runs against a simple alternative explanation that 
participants did not follow prospective instructions following hypnotic induction. 
One way to explain these findings is suggested by the results of the Burgess et al. (2001) study 
that introduced the experimental task we used. They found that the prospective responses in the 
execution condition were underlined by a significant change in activity of the DLPFC and the 
thalamus in comparison to the expectation condition. Importantly, comparing the expectation and 
execution conditions to the baseline condition, there was a significant increase of regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in a range of cortical areas, including the frontal pole (BA10) 
bilaterally and the right lateral frontal cortex. This means that maintaining and realizing a 
prospective intention is differentiable only by the activity change of the DLPFC and the 
thalamus. Interestingly, according to Burgess et al. (2001) this difference reflects that the 
involvement of this region is not associated with target recognition itself or with post-detection 
retrieval processes, but with some form of anticipatory processing. This anticipatory process can 
involve checking the current stimulus against the stored representation of the target or perhaps 
some abstract decision strategy concerning the sequence of processing of ongoing and 
prospective stimuli (Burgess et al., 2001). However, this conclusion was based on the fact that 
Burgess et al. (2001) did not find an increase in RTs in the execution condition compared to the 
expectation condition. In the current study, however, we found a significant RT difference 
between expectation and execution conditions, in both the alert [t(22) = -14.09, p < .001, r = .95] 
and the hypnotic [t(22) = -9.99, p < .001, r = .90]  conditions. Regarding this difference between 
the two studies, it might be the case that executing the PM responses involved a kind of post-
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detection monitoring process in the current study, and this monitoring process caused the 
increase of RTs in the execution condition. 
The present findings seem to be important from the point of view of contemporary theories of 
PM. Both SAS and PAM assume that the involvement of the executive system or controlled 
attention is critical in carrying out adequate PM responses (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004), whereas the multiprocess model proposes 
that automatic processes can trigger PM responses if the PM cue and the response are strongly 
associated (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004). Our findings give support to all 
these assumptions, because decreasing the level of attentional control by hypnosis did not change 
the accuracy of PM responses, but attenuated the extra load of attentional control measured by 
RTs. As a consequence, our results showed that executive control processes were involved in 
checking and responding to PM cues in the awake condition, however, their involvement was not 
necessary for successful and fast production of PM responses, probably because PM cues were 
salient and easily detectable. 
Our findings suggest that hypnosis affected the executive control of prospective memory 
responses.  It might be the case that, following hypnotic induction, participants were less 
frequently monitoring PM cues in the execution condition. Presumably they responded to PM 
cues in a more associative way, without executive control, compared to the condition when they 
were in an alert state of consciousness. Our findings are in line with earlier results showing that 
hypnosis mainly altered the executive functions associated with the activity of the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (Egner et al., 2008). These results are also in line with results demonstrating 
that lesion in the DLPFC did not result in PM deficit in contrast to the injury of the rostral frontal 
(frontopolar) cortex (Burgess et al., 2000, 2008). Executive control processes associated to the 
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DLPFC might play a role in complex PM functions, in which monitoring of context change in a 
task is crucial for adaptive solution of the task. Without executive control, PM responses might 
be more rigid and prone to false alarms especially in situations where, infrequently, inhibition of 
correct response is required. How hypnosis alters the execution of complex PM functions is the 
question of future investigations. 
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Figure 1  
Description of the tasks: a) Ongoing task: Press the key (left or right) in the direction of 
black arrow. b) PM task: if the two color bars are the same color, press the up-arrow key. 
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Figure 2 
Mean reaction times by condition for the ongoing task. Note: Error bars show standard 
error of the mean. 
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Figure 3 
Mean reaction times for the ongoing and PM tasks in the execution condition. Note: Error 
bars show standard error of the mean. 
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Table 1 
The expectation and execution costs in the alert waking and hypnotic state  
 
Alert waking state Hypnotic state  Paired Comparison State 
Mean                    SD 
 
Mean                SD  t                         p 
Expectation cost 33.28                   59.37  52.14                   41.28  -1.22                    n.s.  
Execution cost 166.01                 51.83  142.01                 37.49   2.40                   .025 
 
Note. SD, standard deviation; RT, reaction time (msec); Expectation cost = Mean RTs 
expectation condition - Mean RTs baseline condition; Execution cost = Mean RTs ongoing task 
execution condition – Mean RTs baseline condition, n.s., not significant 
 
